



Nonfatal Shooting (NFS) Investigation Assessments

Observations From the Field

Today's Presenters



Mark Kraft

- Retired Senior Special Agent, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
- Mark Kraft Firearms Consulting and Training



Mike Medaris

- Retired Senior Policy Advisor, Bureau of Justice Assistance
- Retired, Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police Department



Brian Russell

- Deputy Chief of Investigations, Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice
- Retired Captain, Major Crimes Division, Richmond, Virginia, Police Department


NFS Investigation Assessments

- Ten National Public Safety Partnership agencies
- Requested by the agency; approved by the Bureau of Justice Assistance
- Process—review the agency response from scene to presentment for prosecution
- Pre-site visit, assessment team reviews of
 - Crime and calls for service data
 - Policies and procedures
 - MOUs with state, federal, and local law enforcement agencies
 - Union contract
 - Organization chart
 - Agency response to a 51-question survey on its existing policies, procedures, staffing, records management systems, facilities, resources, staffing, equipment, etc.



On-Site Assessment Activities

- Reviews of randomly selected open and closed NFS investigation files
- Reviews of crime analysis and intelligence products
- Interviews of personnel from
 - Command
 - Patrol officers and supervisors
 - Forensic technicians and supervisors
 - Investigators and supervisors
 - Victim Services staff and supervisors
 - Relevant federal, state, and county prosecutors
 - Federal law enforcement agencies, i.e., ATF, DEA, FBI, USMS

The background of the slide is a close-up photograph of a crime scene. It features a red handgun lying on a dark surface, with a yellow caution tape that reads "POLICE LINE - DO NOT CROSS" stretched across it. A brass bullet casing is visible near the handgun. The lighting is dramatic, highlighting the textures of the gun and the tape.

Consistent Factors Throughout the Agencies

- Gang disputes, drug trafficking (e.g., drug rips, market protection, collections), and interpersonal conflict drive most gun violence
- Shooters and their victims are often interchangeable; “today’s shooter, tomorrow’s victim”
- Victims and witnesses are reluctant to cooperate
- All reported clearance rates are under the national average; UCR Table 27: 29.2 percent in 2017 and 25.3 percent in 2018
- Training—on various subjects—was expressed as a continuing need



Patrol

- Patrol respondents invariably recited first responder duties; lack of basic knowledge was not an impediment
- Crime Gun Intelligence Center (or its equivalent) agencies reported diligent collection by patrol officers of cartridges from shooting scenes (with or without victims or property damage)
- Suboptimal returns on intelligence from field interviews and investigative stops



Examining Patrol

- Reports lacked detail; missing victim and witness information; often inaccurate information
- Crime scene logs underused
- Witness canvasses undone or poorly documented
- Initial NFS offense report lag times created by restrictions of patrol overtime
- Video collection canvasses seldom completed or documented
- Retaliatory violence assessments underemployed
- Not all NFS offense scenes were supervised



Examining Patrol

- Explosive-detection canines (if available) were seldom considered as part of the preliminary investigation
- Crime analysis products for patrol seldom exceeded hot-spot mapping
- Patrol personnel are often disengaged—by policy, practice, or culture—from investigative outcomes of the agency

Examining Investigative Function



- No policy or the existing NFS investigative policy is dated
- Investigator scheduling inconsistent with peak gun violence periods
- Lack of essential NFS investigation training (variable among the ten agencies)
 - Investigative techniques; witness management; social media exploitation; video recovery methods; cell phone forensics; NIBIN leads; open and restricted information/intelligence sources; forensic applications, etc.
 - Case management, investigative process training for supervisors of investigative units
- NFS case files disorganized, missing important information, etc.

Examining Investigative Function



- Investigators performing administrative duties unrelated to investigative function
- No investigative support specialists assigned to investigative unit
- Video collection undone or delayed by lack of equipment or knowledgeable personnel
- Retaliatory assessments not routinely performed
- Specialized unit databases (narcotics, gangs, etc.) not immediately available to NFS investigators
- Case handoffs—no scene-to-prosecution investigative policy

Examining Investigative Function



- Existing policies do not establish regular NFS case management reviews (24-hour, 72-hour, and 30-day) procedures or are not routinely performed
- Suspect identification procedures are inconsistent with evidence-based sequential, double-blind best practice
- Not all NFS scenes are attended by investigators; differential response decisions are predicated on injury severity or victim/witness initial degree of cooperation
- Little bidirectional communication between investigative units and patrol divisions




Examining Administrative/Management

- Extraction of NFS data from UCR Aggravated Assault category impeded by lack of agency NFS definition
- No formal selection process for investigative positions
- Crime analysis products limited to tabulation exercises for performance management purposes
- Lack of interagency intelligence sharing and investigative planning activities to coordinate enforcement pertaining to prolific gun violence offenders or groups
- Gun violence meetings are recitations rather than meaningful targeting, investigative planning, or follow-up activity discussions




Examining Administrative/Management

- Paper-based case files; inadequate, antiquated record management systems
- No community trauma outreach programs and partnerships with faith-based, nonprofit, and other city agencies
- Unit-specific databases, e.g., gang, narcotics, etc., difficult to access for NFS investigative purposes



Critical Elements: Patrol

- Through practice, training, and policy, patrol officers become “first investigators” instead of “first reporters”
 - Supervise all NFS offense scenes
 - Increase communication between patrol and investigative functions with in-service training, roll-call briefings, and feedback loops
 - Provide preliminary investigation checklists, standard scene briefing reports, and initial retaliatory violence assessments



Critical Elements: NFS Investigations

- Investigative policy requires case reviews at 24-hour, 72-hour, and 30-day intervals of open investigations
- Investigator duty schedules correspond with peak gun violence periods (to be determined by agency analysis)
- New investigator training—both formal and informal (OJT)
- Case management training for supervisors of investigative units

Critical Elements: Administration

- Organized, formal selection process for investigator positions
- Investigative support specialists
- Install neighborhood trauma mitigation and reassurance programs such as Operation RESET (Richmond, Virginia, Police Department)
- Eliminate information silos created by individual units; consolidate or ease access to individuals with a right to know and a need to know
- Ensure that gun violence information sharing sessions include next investigative steps and output/outcome accountability discussions
- Collaborate with federal, state, and local agencies to identify and incapacitate high-risk individuals and groups

Final Thoughts

- Through training, practice, and culture, ensure that patrol personnel are invested in the investigative outcomes of the agency
- Develop quality control policies and procedures that put “the right people on the bus.” Provide training and resource appropriately
- Mitigate agency resources limitations with force-multiplier partnerships with local, state, and federal prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies to ensure that high-risk groups and offenders are incapacitated



Questions?

Relevant Websites

- Better Policing Toolkit, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL261/better-policing-toolkit.html>
- BJA National Training and Technical Assistance Center, <https://bjatta.bja.ojp.gov/>
- Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policing Matrix, <http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/the-matrix/>
- Crime Analysis on Demand, Bureau of Justice Assistance National Training and Technical Assistance Center, <https://bj.a.ojp.gov/program/crime-analysis/training>
- Crime Gun Intelligence Centers, <https://crimegunintelcenters.org/>
- Crime-Solutions.gov, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, <https://crimesolutions.gov/>
- Cure Violence, <http://cureviolence.org/>
- National Public Safety Partnership Clearinghouse, <https://nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/Clearinghouse>
- Strategies for Policing Innovation, <http://www.strategiesforpolicinginnovation.com/>
- The United Kingdom College of Policing Crime Reduction Toolkit, <https://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Welcome.aspx>

Contact Us



Carolyn Binder
Senior Manager, IIR
Phone: (850) 300-7849
Mobile: (850) 210-8033
Email: cbinder@iir.com



Joe McHale
Senior Manager, IIR
Phone: (850) 300-7760
Mobile: (850) 404-4101
Email: jmchale@iir.com

Thank You!



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